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h_ I PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM  ~ 
May 18, 1978 Conference -~ rt<....o ~J....,~ 
List 1, Sheet 2 Cert to Mass. SJC ~ 
(Liacos, for the court~ _ -d __ ~ 
-~~~~-No. 77-1388 
l.fASSACHUSETTS ~  t-.5 s 1s> &A:.&.c:,...~~-c:::.,.,---,....c~...., 
v. ~~ 
1. Petr presents a 
syo-~r~a~ ~ ~E~\ 
potent~ally certworthy ~estio~~- ~ 
WHITE 
May statements that are held inadmissible at trial (because the 
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right 
to counsel and to remain silent after receiving Miranda warnings) 
be used to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant? There also is a question whether the decision below is 
final. (W~0 ~ vt-~~~ 
Di~c,ww . Set bQrJ. . 
( 
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2. FACTS: Resp drove his car off the road at two o'clock 
in the morning. and hit several posts. The Chief of Police of 
Ashfield, Mass. went to the scene of the accident and noticed 
that resp appeared to be under the influence of either drugs 
or alcohol, or both. He read resp the Miranda warnings, 
arrested him, and called the state police. Trooper Taliaferro 
of the state police arrived, and the three men went to State 
Police Barracks. There Trooper Taliaferro again read resp his 
· L 
rights and told him that his license would be suspended if he 
refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. Resp consented but 
also tried, in vain, to contact a lawyer. About 40 minutes later 
the breathalyzer test was administered; the results of the 
test created a statutory presumption that resp had been driving 
~  under the influence of intoxicating liquor. After the test, 
1 
_, 
resp and discovered a marijuana cigarette in his shirt pocket. 
The trooper advised resp that he also would be charged with 
possession of marijuana and again read the Miranda warnings. 
Resp replied that he saw nothing wrong in the possession of one 
marijuana cigarette. The trooper then asked him if he had any other 
l marijuana on his person or in the car, and resp said he had more marijuana in his car. He also stated that he could name some 
"biggies", apparently referring to drug dealers whom he was willing 
to identify in exchange for leniency, but Trooper Taliaferro told 
him not to say anything further. 
On the basis of resp's statements, the trooper prepared an 
affidavit in support of an application for a warrant to search resp's 
( 
car, which he obtained. 
a substantial quantity 
LSD, as well as $3,195 
. - 3 -
The search of the car's trunk turned up ~ 
of marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, and 
in cash stored in a strong box. Resp 
was tried for possession of the controlled substances with intent 
to distribute. 
Resp moved to suppress his statements and the evidence 
seized in his car, on the ground that he had not made a knowing 
~ and intelligent waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain 
silent. The trial court (Moriarty, J.) agreed that the statements 
<----------, 
were inadmissible. He reasoned that resp affirmativel~had ----~ 
attempted to obtain counsel; that the trooper did not view resp's 
initial statement (about the single marijuana cigarette) as a 
waiver of rights, because he told resp not to say anymore when 
resp volunte red to identify the "biggies''; and that resp was 
obviously u der the influence of al·cohol at the time, which was 
indicated by the breathalyzer test, by resp's strange behavior as 
testified to by the police officers. The court noted that the 
SJC has made it clear that when a suspect has been brought in on 
a charge of drunkenness, the police should not proceed with 
questioning on the basis of a waiver of Miranda rights until the 
suspect is "clearly capable of responding intelligently. 
The court held, however, that the evidence seized in l resp's car was admissible. 
as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, and its progeny deal 
Finding little guidance in precedent, 
with the converse situation of a statement being given in 
( 
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response to an unlawful search, the court concluded that 
"the prophylactic approach of Miranda . should [not] be 
extended to exclude evidence obtained as an indirect result of 
a suspect's in-custody statement, where there has been no purposeful 
attempt to subvert the defendant's rights." Petn 17a. The 
court found support in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, where 
this Court upheld the admissibility of testimony of a witness who 
had been discovered as a result of a defendant's statement which 
had been given without advising him of his right to appointed 
counsel if he was indigent. The Court observed in Michigan v. 
Tucker: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged 
in willful, or at the very least negligent conduct 
which has deprived the defendant of his rights. 
Where the officer's conduct was pursued in complete 
good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses 
much of its force." 
417 U.S., at 447. The court here found that the police "were 
scrupulous in their efforts to obey the mandate of Miranda." It 
elaborated as follows: 
"The defendant's rights were read to him on no less 
than t~ons, and the officers made no 
attempt whatever to interrogate him with regard to 
the crime for which he w~s initially arrested. 
I 
The only interrogation of the defendant consisted 
of a S1fig ie qtre s t 10n which was put to him after 
the mar1JUana c1garette was discovered in his 
shirt pocket, and after he had been read the 
warnings for the third time. Furthermore, that 
question was in respons~n UQSOlicit~~ stat~ment 
b~t to the effect that he d1d not 
regard possession of the single cigarette as a 
crime •... I am satisfied that Trooper Taliaferro 
asked the single question as a natural consequence 
of the immediately preceding events, and without 
any conscious intent to deny the defendant his 
- 5 -
( right to silence or his right to the assistance of 
counsel." 
Petn 19a. The court's ultimate conclusion was that the . evidence 
seized in the search should not be suppressed under the circumstances, 
' 
because it would not further the deterrent purposes of the 
exclusionary rule when there was "no police misconduct". 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed resp's conviction and 
• :;;;;:;:::::- / 
ordered a new trial without the evidence. In doing so, it followed 
its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Haas, Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2212 (1977), where it was held that evidence obtained in violation 
of Miranda may not be used to establish probable cause for an arrest. 
The court seems to have thought its decision was somewhat incon-
sistent with Michigan v. Tucker because it cited it as a "but cf.". 
Petn 7a. The court reasoned that the policy underlying suppression 
of fruits of an unlawful search is less compelling than fruits of 
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because statements 
are less likely to be reliable than evidence obtained in even an 
unlawful search. The court therefore held that the evidence would 
have to be suppressed at resp's retrial. 
The court made two other points that are worth mentioning. 
First, it affirmed the trial court's ruling that the existence 
of probable cause in support of the search warrant "unquestionably 
depended upon the statement of the defendant, quoted in the 
affidavit •. II Second, it concluded that the search could 
not be validated as a warrantless search. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The State contends that this is a novel 




in Michigan v. Tucker suggests that the court below was wrong. 
It contends that the decision represents an "unwarranted expansi 
of Miranda. The State notes that statements taken in violation 
of Miranda can be used for impeachment purposes, Harris v. 
New York, 401 U.S. 222, and evidence illegally seized by 
state authorities may be used in federal civil proceedings, 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433. It also 
inadmissible at trial may be used to establish probable cause 
for a search warrant (e.g., hearsay). "The Commonwealth suggests 
that, in the instant case, the interest of the public in having 
a defendant's guilt or innocence determined on the basis of 
trustworthy evidence outweighs the need to deter improper police 
misconduct." . Petn 9. Finally, the State says that although this 
Court said in Michigan v. Tucker that the "fruits of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun could be applied to Fifth 
as well as Fourth Amendment violations, a proper case for such 
application would have to be one in which the police acted in bad 
faith, given the deterrence policies underlying the exclusionary 
rule. 
Resp replies, first, that this is not a final judgment 
because resp has yet to be retried. On the mer~ts, resp distinguishes 
Tucker on the ground that that decision involved police activity 
before Miranda, and this was a significant factor in the Court's 
decision. In addition, the Tucker Court emphasized that all that 
had happened in Tucker was that the procedural safeguards of the 
constitutional right had not been provided; the defendant's 
- 7 -
constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination itself 
had not been violated. 417 U.S., at 444. Here, on the contrary 
the Miranda warnings were given but the police asked resp a 
question in the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
And this was after resp affirmatively demonstrated a desire for 
counsel. 
Resp submits that "if the police are allowed to use illegally 
obtained confessions and admissions for clues . • . , then the 
warning requirements of Miranda would be meaningless, for the 
police would be permitted to accomplish indirectly what they 
could not achieve directly." Response 7. Finally, resp notes 
that the decision below is consistent with a Maryland intermediate 
appellate decision in which fruits of a confession, obtained not 
because of an inadvertent failure to give the Miranda warnings 
but in the absence of a valid waiver, were suppressed. In re 
Appeal No. 245 (75), 349 A.2d 434 (Md. App. 1975). 
4. DISCUSSION: It seems to me the decision is final under 
the third category of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 481. This involves cases where, "if the party seeking interim 
review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be 
,-
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the governing 
state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims 
for review." Here, if resp is convicted upon retrial, the issue 
presented here will be moot; if he is acquitted, most likely the 
State would not be able to appeal. (Cox Broadcasting cited 
California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, as an example of the third 
- category. There the Court noted that if the defendant in that case 
( , ,_., 
- 8 -
were acquitted, an appeal by the State would be disallowed by 
state law. I do not know what the Massachusetts law is. on this 
point. The Court might want to check into this point if it is 
considering a grant.) 
On the merits, no case clearly governs this one. Michigan v. ·-Tucker is the closest, but resp is correct that the Court 
emphasized in that case that the defect consisted only in not 
giving all the warnings later held to be required in Miranda. 
\
The Court held that there had not been a violation of the 
defendant's constitutional rights, and therefore that Wong Sun 
did not apply. The same cannot be said in this case. 
~ 1/ ~' This case therefore presents an open question. On the one 
hand, the police conduct here was found to be in good faith. 
Petr says the deterrent purpose of the exclusinary rule would 
not be served by excluding the evidence in this case. On the 
other hand, the trooper questioned resp when he had not given a 
valid waiver of rights, and so there was a violation of his 
co~stitut ional rig hts, which the Court said was absent in Tucker . 
.; 
Except for the one state case cited by resp, the parties 
do not cite lower court decisions on this question. Its 
resolution therefore could be deferred. This case does present 
a clean set of facts for considering the issue, however, and the 
opinions below -- and the parties' briefs -- are clear. 
There is a response. 
5/12/78 
sl 
Bregstein Opns in petn 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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May 2.3, 1978 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONFERENCE 
Subject: No. 77-1388, Massachusetts v. Charles F. White 
This case has been relisted for the May 25 Conference, 
List 3, Sheet 2. 
The legal officers were asked to determine if there 
was any reason why this case should not be granted to con-
sider whether the Mass. SJC correctly held that physical 
evidence derived from a search warrant, whose sufficiency 
depends on a statement of res~ should be suppressed because 
the statement had been made in the absence of an intelligent 
and voluntary waiver of resp's Miranda rights. 
Summary: There do not appear to be any jurisdictional 
or other. problems in this case. 
Discussion: 1. Jurisdiction. Although the Mass SJC reversed 
resp 's a conviction and remanded for a new trial, the 
decision appears to satisfy the finality requirement of 28 
U.S.C. 1257 (3). Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 481 (1975) (" [T] he federal claim has been finally 
decided, · with further proceedings on the merits in the 
state courts to come, but •.. later review of the federal 
issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the 
case "~ If resp is convicted upon retrial without the 
suppressed evidence, which seems unlikely, the suppression 
question will be moot; if resp is acquitted, the state will 
be precluded from appealing. ~/ 
Regarding the latter consideration,under state law the 
only appeal of right the prosecution has is from decisions 
dismissing an indictment or complaint. See Mass. Gen. Laws. 
Ann., ch. 278, §28E (West). In addition, it may seek leave 
from a justice or the chief justice of the SJC for leave to 
take an interlocutory appeal from the suppression of evidence. 
Ibid. Thus, although the Double Jeopardy Clause might allow 
a state to appeal from an acquittal seeking reinstatement of a prior 
*/In Cohen v. New York, 385 U.S. 976 (1966), relied 
upon by resp (Br. in Op. 4), the Court denied cert "for want 
of a final judgment," but there the petn was filed by the 
-~ defendant following the state's successful interlocutory 
appeal from the suppression of evidence, and the considerations 
governing finality are different . 
. •. "' 
.... , 
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conviction on the ground that it had been reversed errone-
ously, a prosecutor in Mass. would lack statutory authority 
to take such an appeal. 
2. The Merits. There do not appear to be any 
other problems in this case. That the SJC decided the 
question on the basis of federal constitutional law is 
apparent from the citation of its own decision in Commonwealth 
v. Haas, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1977) 2212, 2225, which relied on 
cases-from CA 5, CA 7, and several other state appellate 
courts. 
Conclusion: 
in this case. 
There do not appear to be any problems 
Marc Richman 
Legal Officer 





)b. 17- )J!! 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
74 ~ .. ~..t-
p. 
Mark Richman concludes that there are no bugs in this 
~' a~I agree. But I thought I'd offer a brief description 
of the constraints that 8H would face the Court in considering 
this case and a brief discussion of the merits. 
There are two factual findings below that would place 
constraints on this Court's scqpe _2f review in considering 
"-"" ...... -~ ._. 
this case.~ the courts below concluded that ~exx resp 
had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his 
compulsory 
privilege against/self-incrimination and his right to counsel. 
I noticed that you questioned this conclusion at seve~ 
points in the preliminary memo. Did you mean by these question 
marks that you thought resp did waive his rights when he 
/ 
2. 
made the comments summarized on p. 2 of the memo? If so, 
I would just point out that xke in considering the merits 
of the case, the Court will be bound by the conclusions 
below that there was not a valid waiver of rights. 
The ~m below is t~ the police officers 
acted in good faith, and that the constitutional violation 
was inadvertent. This conclusion also is questionable, as 
one might argue that the trooper's question to resp about 
whether he had more marijuana in his possession was deliberate. 
Indeed, although the trial court clearly found that the -- - - - -trooper acted in good faith and that "he asked the single 
~ ....,..,.....,....,_. 
question as a natural consequence of the immediately 
preceding events, and without any conscious intent to deny 
the defendant his [constitutional rights]", see memo at 4-5, 
the trial court also concluded that the trooper did not 
regard resp's initial statement about the single marijuana 
cigarette as a waiver of rights. See memo at 3. Some 
Justices might have trouble with the characterization of 
the trooper's actions as inadvertent, because of this seeming 
inconsistency in the trial court's findings. 
If you think these factual predicates will get in the 
way of the Court's consideration of the legal issue, then 
you might want to withdraw your vote to grant. On the other 
hand, this case strikes me as cleaner and more clear than 
most, so it's probably a good vehicle for considering the issue, 
' 
as long as the findings below (of invalid waiver and inadvertence 
of the constitutional violation) are accepted. 
3. 
On the merits, I think the question will be a close 
one; and the fact that there are only 4 votes to grant 
suggests that the balance may tip in favor of affirmance. 
As discussed in the memo, there are good arguments on 
both sides. In resp's favor . is the point that the xais ------"' 
rationale of Wong Sun is fully applicable here: the police 
will know that even if they cannot use an unconstitutionally 
obtained statement at the trial, they may be able to 
discover admissible evidence by questioning the defendant. 
The state's response to that is that this rationale does not 
apply when the police action is inadvertent. This argument 
is a good one, as a matter of theory, but here is where 
the lower courts' findings of good faith will be troublesome 
to some Justices. The trooper's question to resp certainly 
was deliberate, in the sense that the trooper meant to ask 
it. · I suppose what the lower courts meant was that it just -slipped out; he wasn't fishing for a clue in order to get 
evidence against resp. The state's next argument is that 
the evidence obtained is highly probabive, and the exclusionary 
rule is strong medicine, especially under these circumstances 
of probative evidence and axg police anduct not found to be 
in bad faith. 
Court .. . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . · ·· :.' Voted on ............. . .... , 19 .. . 
Argued .. . . ............... , 19 .. . Assigned .... . .. . .. . ....... , 19 . . . 
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Motion for Leave to 
Proceed In Forma Pauperis 
Cert to Mass. Supreme Judicial Court was granted May 30 . 
Respondent has filed the necessary affidavit and seeks leave to 
proceed ifp . )---
The underlying issue is whether statements held inadmissible 
at trial (because defendant did not knowingly and intelligently 
waive his Miranda rights ) can be used to establish probable cause 
for the issuance of a search warrant . 
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Motion of resp for leave to proceed further herein if£· 
\ 
JURISDICTIONAL \ ' 
HOLD 1--CE-,R_T_.-+----,:..ST_A_T:..:E:.;:.M..:...E:.:N..:...'l::,....'--+-M-E--,Rr-lT_S_' +-M-O-,-TI_O_N__j BSEN'l' NOT VOTING 
FOR 
G D N POST DI S AFF REV AFF G D 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
Brennan, J ........................... . 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J ............................ . 
Marshall, J .......................... . ····~············ ·········· 
Blackmun, J ......................... . 
Powell, J ................ .......... . . . ... ~ ...................... . 
Rehnquist, J ........... . . ....• ...................... 
Stevens, J ........................... . . .. - ~ ...................... . 
. u ..................... .. 
~ 
~J The primary issue in this case is whether physical ..... =w 
' e~idence that is the "fruit" of a statement obtained by the 
at 
~ ~ a defendant's criminal trial. The case is complicated by a 
--/ '-*- &d-~. ~~~- J'~~ 
-,.btA..-~~~.-,~~ ~k-v 
~~~ ~{G· .. e. hH>~tLo~ 
~~ t1/'1Lv ~)I ~,e.,(.~~6-~  
difficult factual question: whether reap's statement was taken 
under conditions rendering it not only inadmissible under 
Miranda, but also involuntary in the traditional Fifth Amendment 
sense. 
The briefs in this case are mediocre at best, but the 
issue is straightforward, the facts are not complicated, and each 
party's arguments are made relatively clear from their papers. 
This memo will therefore be restricted to describing the one 
----------~---------------------------------------factual point that I perceive to be of greatest importance and to 
setting out the analysis I believe to be correct. 
The controlling legal question, which I believe is not 
really open for discussion any longer, is whether Miranda 
~----
warnings are constitutional requirements rather than judicially-
created procedures to effectuate the policies of the Fifth 
Amendment. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 u.s. 433 (1974), and Harris 
v. ~York, 401 u.s. 222 (1971), in my opinion, compel the 
latter conclusion. Assuming there has been no more than a 
Miranda, as opposed to a Fifth Amendment, violation in this case, 
the question therefore becomes whether the exclusionary rule 
should be applied through the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine to physical evidence located because of statements 
obtained contrary to Miranda. The answer depends on whether the 
benefits, if any, are outweighed by the obvious costs of such a 
rule. If a Fifth Amendment violation has occurred, however, the 
question is whether the "fruit" doctrine must be applied to 
exclude evidence discovered as a result of statements obtained 
involuntarily in the traditional, or constitutional, sense. 
2. 
II. THE FACTUAL PROBLEM 
It is unclear from the opinion of the two state courts 
below whether resp was found to have been so intoxicated that any 
statements made in response to police questioning were 
necessarily compelled in the Fifth Amendment sense. The officers 
testified that he was "bouncing off the walls," etc., and from ----
the portion of the record quoted in resp's brief at 23-24, it 
appears that the police finally decided to put resp in a jail 
cell after it appeared that he was unable to use the telephone 
successfully. The trial court thus would have been justified in 
concluding that any statements made by resp in response to police 
questioning were not "the product of a rational intellect and a 
free will." Mincey v. Arizona, 98 s.ct. 2408 (1978), quoting 
previous decisions. The question, however, is whether such a 
conclusion was actually made. 
The relevant portion of the trial court's opinion is at 
pp. 14a-15a bf the petition for cert; the Supreme Judicial 
Court's pertinent remarks are at pp. 6a-7a. I recommend that you -
look at these carefully. My reading is that, while the trial 
court was not focusing on the difference between a mere failure 
to waive Miranda rights and the giving of an involuntary 
statement in response to police questioning, it believed that 
only the former occurred. Significantly, the court initially 
focuses on resp's attempt to retain an attorney and the police 
officer's apparent belief that resp had not waived his rights. 
3. 
These factors suggest both that the cou~t believed resp was 
capable of rational choice and that the police error consisted 
asking a question before obtaining a clear waiver of rights. 
Res?'S intoxication is mentioned as a third factor. But 
the court does not specify whether this, when added to the other 
circumstances, somehow reinforced the conclusion that resp had 
voluntarily decided not to waive his rights, or whether the 
intoxication made resp incapable of waiving his rights and, 
presumably, also of making voluntary statements in response to 
police questioning. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion does not clarify 
this point. That court seems to have believed that the attempt 
to call an attorney and the officer's apparent belief that res? 
had not wiaved his rights were sufficient in themselves to show 
the absence of waiver. This would assume that resp was 
sufficiently rational to decline to waive his rights. The SJC 
then refers to the intoxication, saying that it would have been 
"the more prudent and constitutionally preferable course for the 
police to withhold any further questioning 'until [the defendant] 
was clearly capable of responding intelligently.'" It is simply 
impossible to be positive that the SJC, by this statement, is not 
saying that resp was incapable of making voluntary responses to 
the officer's questions. But taken in context, I think the 
better reading is that the the court believed resp was capable of 
-<-----~--------------~--.---~----------------------------------------------~ voluntary action, that he had asserted his Miranda right to 
__.--.w -obtain counsel (which was not yet a Sixth Amendment right since 
formal criminal charges had not been brought), and that further 





questioning was impermissible for that reason alone. Under this 
reading of the lower courts' findings of fact, resp's 
intoxication, while not strictly relevant to whether a waiver of 
rights had occured, was seen as no more than a prudential factor 
that should have suggested to the police that they not attempt 
further questioning at that time. 
III. EXCLUSION IF MIRANDA ALONE WAS VIOLATED? 
If I am correct that the courts below found that resp's 
statement was voluntary but obtained in violation of ~iranda, the 
question is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied 
through the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Under 
l~ recent case law, I think it is quite clear that it should not. 
Michigan v. Tucker, supra, and Harris v. New ·York, 
supra, are cases in which the Court allowed the use of statements 
obtained against a defendant in violation of Miranda. In Tucker, 
a statement by the defendant led the police to a witness who 
testified adversely to him. In Harris, statements taken in ---·--
violation of Miranda were used to impeach the defendant, who 
chose to testify at trial. In each case the Court made it clear 
that the statements were not involuntary in the traditional 
sense, but only that all the procedural requirements of Miranda 
, 
had not been complied with. The necessary implication of these ·~~ 
~~.:-~ 
holdings is that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally -·,~ 
~~ 
mandated rules, but are "constitutional common law" created by ~. 






Amendment. Thus, Miranda warnings are on a par with the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule which, as Stone v. Powell makes 
clear, is not a personal constitutional right of the accused. 
The Court said as much in Tucker: "the police conduct at issue 
here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege 
against compulsory incrimination, but departed only from the 
prophylactic standards laid down by this Court in Miranda to 
safeguard that privilege." 417 U.S. at 445-446. 
Tucker is not necessarily controlling here, because the 
"fruit" involved in that case was a live witness rather than, as 
here, physical evidence. But the Court has recently said that 
"live-witness testimony is not always or even usually more 
reliable or dependable than inanimate evidence. Indeed, just the 
\._..I opposite may be true." united ·states v. Ceccolini, 98 S.Ct. 
1054, 1061 (1978). The burden therefore should be on resp to 
show why the nature of the "fruit" qathered as a result of the 
inadmissible statement should make a difference in the outcome of 
the case. 
I believe the critical arguments cut against resp. The 
primary purposes of the Miranda are to deter police misconduct 
and to provide clear guidelines to which the police can conform 
their conduct. Neither of these policies would be sacrificed by 
refusing to apply the "fruit" doctrine when a statement is found 
to be voluntary, even in the absence of compliance with Miranda. 
The Miranda warninqs become no less clearly defined; their 
content remains unchanged, and the police are still expected to 
deliever them in every case. 
6. 
More important, the desired deterrent effect of Miranda 
is not likely to be seriously diluted." Resp and the Mass. SJC 
claim that refusing to apply the "fruit" doctine in this case 
would create an incentive to police to ask questions in violation 
of Miranda in hopes of locating damaging evidence against the 
accused. I find it difficult to believe that an officer would 
deliberately risk the admissibility of a confession itself by 
ignoring Miranda in hopes of locating evidence favorable to the 
prosecution. As the Court said in Harris, "[a]ssuming that the 
exclusionary rule [that applies when Miranda is violated] has a 
deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient 
deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made 
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief." 401 U.S. 
at 225. 
On the other hand the societal costs of excluding 
relevant evidence whose probative value is unimpeached is 
obviously great, as you pointed out in Stone v. Powell. Thus, 
even if some marginal incentive to disregard Miranda were 
created, it would be justified by the countervailing social 
interests. 
It may be worth noting that as a matter of analysis it 
may be easier to restrict the exclusionary rule in this case than 
it was in~tone v. Powell. There it was assumed that a 
constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment had occured. 
The question was whether to apply a particular judicial remedy 
for that violation. Ip this £?Se, by contrast, the violation is 
not of the Constitution, but merely of judicial rules intended to 
7. 
8. 
implement constitutional policy. Thus, , the holding recommended 
in this case would seem to be justifiable a fortiori in light of 
stone v. Powell. 
IV. EXCLUSION IF THE CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED? 
Resp argues that the statement that led the police to 
the physical evidence was obtained not only in violation of his 
Miranda rights, but also unconstitutionally because it was 
involuntary. If the Court should be persuaded that this is 
correct, then the analysis would be different. The question 
--------------------------------
would then be whether the Court wished to apply the "fruit" 
doctrine to statements that have been obtained because of police 
coercion. Although it still could be argued that excluding such 
evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief would provide 
sufficient deterrence, the Court would probably (and properly) be 
much more hesitant to take this step. For one thing, it is less 
evident that the "fruit" doctrine is merely a judicial 
~----------------------------------------------
prophylactic rather than constitutional requirement. Even if the 
former is true, other considerations weigh in favor of the 
"fruit" doctrine in this situation. The constitutional policies 
against compelling a defendant to participate in his own 
conviction come into full play when a statement is truly 
involuntary, and the reliablility of involuntary statements 
becomes a major problem. 
With respect to the reliability problem, it could be 
argued that when the evidence is taken before a magistrate, as 
was done here, that judicial officer's independen~ evaluation of 
the facts offered to show probable cause is an adequate safequard 
against unreliability, i.e., the issue becomes a Fourth rather 
than a Fifth Amendment problem. That argument has obvious 
difficulties, however. Is the magistrate to refuse to rely on 
all statements that he perceives to have been obtained 
involuntarily, or may he consider those that, in spite of any 
Fifth Amendment problems, are sufficiently reliable? And what 
happens when, as here, the affidavit of the police officer does 
not disclose the facts suggesting involuntariness? 
If resp's statement is deemed to have been involuntarily 
taken from him, then the Court would be taking a dramatic step in 
refusing to apply the "fruit" doctrine, one that I would not 
recommend and with which I suspect you would disagree. If the 
Court is in doubt about the voluntariness issue, I recommend that 
~--------~-------------------------------dismissal or a remand be considered. The Court could either 
---------D.I.G. the case, stating that the ambiguity on voluntariness in 
the opinions of the lower courts makes this case unsuitable for 
review, or it could remand for further findings of fact on the 
voluntariness issue. If the latter course were adopted, the 
Court might go ahead and address the merits to inform the lower 
courts of the nature and significance of the findings that need 
to be made and to set a useful precedent. 
·. 
9. 
V. OTHER ISSUES 
Resp claims that the decision below is not final since 
the Mass. SJC ordered a remand. I agree with petr that this case 
falls within one of the Cox exceptions to absolute finality since 
the state, for all practical purposes, has lost its case if the 
judgment of the SJC is not reversed. 
Resp also argues that the decision below may have rested 
on adequate and independent state grounds and that this Court 
should at least remand for clarification on this point. This 
argument is unpersuasive. The SJC's opinion makes no reference 
to state law other than previous decisions of the state courts. 
And the state cases the SJC found most important appear to have 
relied on federal law. See Reply Brief of Petr at 3-7. 
1 0. 
VI. SUMMARY 
I would conclude that Tucker and Harris show that a 
Miranda violation is not a consitutional violation if a 
defendant's statement is voluntarily given. I would read the 
lower courts asn aving found that resp's statement was 
voluntarily made, but nevertheless obtained in violation of 
Miranda because he had not waived the rights granted to him by 
that decision. I would then hold, consistent with Tuc~er, that 
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine will not be extended 
to apply the exclusionary rule to phsyical evidence obtained as a 
result of Miranda violations. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court must be reversed. 
If the Court believes that the lower courts found resp's 
statement to have been involuntarily given in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment, I would affirm. 
If the Court is unsure what the lower courts held on the 
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PER CuRIAM. 
The judgment IS affirmed by an equally divided Court. 
MR. JUSTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
